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Abstract
This paper empirically studies whether it pays off (in terms of economic growth)
to fulfill the convergence criteria on the public budget and participation in the Euro–
zone. The analysis is based on data of European economies with a special focus on
twelve Euro–zone members and a control group of six non–Euro countries for the
years from 1970 to 2014. The results show that growth is higher if the debt to
GDP ratio is below 60 % compared to values above it. Moreover, a comparison
with European economies outside the Euro–zone shows higher growth values for
Euro–members than for the control group. Regression estimations reveal a negative
relationship between the two variables for the Euro–group. For the control group
the relationship is not statistically significant.
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1 Introduction
With signing of the Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht Treaty) in 1992 several
independent European countries joined together and formed the European Union (EU).
By now, the EU has twenty eight member states and still it is promise and aspiration for
many other states, for instance in south eastern Europe. Moreover, nineteen members
agreed upon an even more narrow economic coordination by unifying monetary policy
and introducing the common currency of the Euro.
The Maastricht Treaty (MT) and the Stability and Growth Pact require sound fiscal
policies. For instance, Article 121 of European Union (1997)’s Consolidated Version of the
Treaty on European Union calls for realization of “the sustainability of the government
financial position”. More precisely, in Article 1 of the protocol on the excessive deficit
procedure of the MT defines the reference values of the public debt to GDP ratio at 60%
and the budget deficit at 3 % relative to GDP. But, the situation of the EU and its future
is a highly discussed topic these days. Many urgent political, social and economic topics
such as proceeding of European integration, structural problems and the current economic
situation are concerning the society. Unemployment, the aging population and migration
triggered by civil wars in the immediate neighborhood of the EU challenges social security
budgets. Moreover, with the debate of United Kingdom’s referendum and their decision
in favor of an exit of the EU, the discussion on the future of the EU goes beyond the
scientific community and concerns all EU citizens.
With this paper we reflect on the economics of the EU and the public finance situation.
Especially, we analyze whether a membership pays off in terms of economic growth. We
focus on the convergence criteria of the MT, which request a public debt ratio which
should not exceed 60% of GDP and a budget deficit 3% of GDP (or below), where we put
the special emphasize on the debt ratio level. Do sustainable fiscal policies induce or lead
to higher economic growth? Is there a difference among European countries? Particularly,
is it possible to detect a difference among EU members and non–EU members, or more
precisely: does Euro–zone membership matter?
Our empirical analysis is based on the twelve core Euro–zone members: Austria, Bel-
gium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands,
Portugal and Spain. Moreover, we compare their results with a control group of six Euro-
pean economies which consists of Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom (currently
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EU members) and Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. All of the latter have their own
currency and do not take part in the Euro–zone. The times series cover annual observa-
tions from 1970 to 2014. It shows, that economic growth is higher in Euro–countries than
in the control group of non–Euro economies. Moreover, it pays off to fulfill the budget
reference values: GDP growth is higher if the debt ratio is below 60%. This holds true
independent of the common currency or EU–membership.
Regarding literature contributions, there are many empirical papers analyzing the re-
lationship between public finances and economic growth. A starting point may be the
contribution by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), who study the influence of public debt on
economic growth and find a threshold of 90% beyond which that relationship turns neg-
ative. Though their analysis has been criticized, there are many other studies also indi-
cating a negative relationship between debt and growth such as Kumar and Woo (2010),
Checherita and Rother (2010) or Dreger and Reimers (2013) for instance. The latter two
especially focus on European economies taking part in the Euro–zone. Plus, Dreger and
Reimers (2013) study the effect for Euro–zone and non–Euro–zone members and distin-
guish sustainable and non-sustainable situations referring to the relationship between the
primary surplus, the debt ratio and economic growth. Their central finding shows that the
negative impact of the debt ratio holds only for the Euro–zone (independent of sustain-
ability) whereas the negative effect diminishes in the broader panel of economies. They
come to the conclusion that being monetary union member might involve an additional
risk. Our paper goes into a similar direction, however, we focus on comparing growth
rates separated by the debt ratio criteria based on the Maastricht benchmark. Plus, our
data set is more extensive, both, regarding the time period (45 years) and the range of
control countries. Our descriptive statistic results go into the opposite direction: growth
rates are higher in the Euro–zone than in the control group of non–Euro economies. Plus,
economic growth is higher if the debt ratios are kept low, i.e. below 60% of GDP. However,
our regression outcome also shows a statistically significant effect for the Euro–members
only.
The remainder is structured as follows, the next section presents the empirical part and
describes the data set, the calculations and estimation results. Subsection 2.1 explains the
basic information on the data series and sources and presents some graphical impressions
of the central series. Subsection 2.2 presents the outcomes of statistical calculations and
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subsection 2.3 shows the results of a simple regression estimation and presents the results
of the analyses and some robustness checks. Finally, section 3 summarized the central
findings and concludes.
2 Empirics
2.1 Data
The selection of data was based on availability and the idea was to resort to as few sources
as possible in order to minimize biases based on combining different sources. We tried to
get (or construct) consistent and reliable data series to set up a balanced data panel for the
calculations. The main sources are OECD (2016) for the growth rate and AMECO (2016)
for the debt ratio. Missing values of the debt ratio haven been supplemented by Abbas
et al. (2010) data set and Statistics Norway (2016, 1981 & 1982 observation). Economic
growth is captured in real terms, measured as GDP volume annual growth rate in percent.
The base year is 2010. The 1970 growth rate for Luxembourg is taken from World Bank
(2016) World Development Indicators. Luxembourg’s budget balance data for 1990–1994
stems from SVR (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Lage
2015). For most countries inflation data is taken from the World Bank (2016) World
Development Indicators, measured by the consumer price index. However, due to data
availability, for Germany it comes from International Monetary Fund (2013, updated
by International Monetary Fund, 2014) and is based on calculations of changes in GDP
deflator. The series have been tied together in 1992 due to reunification. For the UK,
inflation also is based on the GDP deflator (source: World Bank, 2016). Icelandic data
has been supplemented by Central Bank of Iceland (1999). Iceland’s 1980 public debt
observations has been taken from International Monetary Fund (2016).
The following graphics illustrate the central series of annual real GDP growth and debt
ratios for the selection of countries. The lines present a non–parametric loess smooth.1
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show them for the Euro–zone economies. Figures 1(c) and 1(d)
present growth and debt for the control group of non–Euro economies. It shows that for
the Euro–group the growth and debt pattern was not uniform among countries, however,
1 All figures and estimations have been implemented in R 3.1.2. The graphs are plotted with the
command ’scatterplot’ in package car, see ? for details.
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Figure 1: EU Growth Rates and Debt Ratios
there seems to be mostly positive growth rates for the earlier years of the analysis, which
turned negative with the crisis. Also, the debt ratios ran differently, but there is a general
positive trend observable, especially with the time period after 2007. Also, in the control
group there is a lot of variability in both series. Especially the development of the debt
ratio differs among groups. Whereas Sweden and Denmark were able to bring down their
ratios following an increase in the seventies and eighties, other countries like the Iceland
experience a rather steady increase. Certainly, the crisis is visible in the recent years.
2.2 Statistical calculations
Table 1 presents the average real economic growth values of the 12 Euro countries under
investigation. According to the reference value they are separated in observations with the
debt ratio below 60% and higher than 60%. The last column presents the overall average
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Table 1: Growth rate Euro–zone, separated by debt ratio level
Country Debt ratio ≤ 60% Debt ratio > 60% Average Time period
Austria 3.09 (N=23) 1.82 (N=22) 2.47 (N=45) 1970–2014
Belgium 3.47 (N= 7) 2.00 (N=38) 2.23 (N=45) 1970–2014
Finland 2.57 (N=45) – 2.57 (N=45) 1970–2014
France 2.78 (N=29) 1.42 (N=16) 2.30 (N=45) 1970–2014
Germany 2.38 (N=32) 1.19 (N=13) 2.03 (N=45) 1970–2014
Greece 3.02 (N=19) 0.99 (N=26) 1.85 (N=45) 1970–2014
Ireland 5.59 (N=18) 3.63 (N=27) 4.41 (N=45) 1970–2014
Italy 3.41 (N=12) 1.16 (N=33) 1.76 (N=45) 1970–2014
Luxembourg 3.65 (N=45) – 3.65 (N=45) 1970–2014
The Netherlands 2.22 (N=26) 2.48 (N=19) 2.33 (N=45) 1970–2014
Portugal 3.51 (N=34) -0.04 (N=11) 2.63 (N=45) 1970–2014
Spain 2.95 (N=35) 1.38 (N=10) 2.60 (N=45) 1970–2014
Panel 3.11 (N=325) 1.75 (N=215) 2.57 (N=540) 1970–2014
in each country. The final row shows the pooled average of the panel.2 The number of
observations is listed in parenthesis. There are N = 45 observations per country leading
to a total of 540 observations.
It shows that for all countries in the panel, the average growth rate is higher if the debt
ratio is kept below the 60 % reference value compared to situations when the debt ratio is
higher (3.11% growth versus 1.75% growth). This also holds true for all individual coun-
tries except the Netherlands. For the interpretation from the economic policy perspective
this result supports the view that is does pay off to fulfill the Maastricht criteria.
Concerning causality, here we assume that debt exceeds an influence on growth. Cer-
tainly, we are aware that the effect may also go the other way around, i.e. economic
growth may affect the debt situation. However, we are interested in this direction of
impact.
In order to be able to evaluate and assess this outcome, we reiterate our calculations
for a selection of six European countries, which either do not take part in the Euro–area
2 All values in tables 1 and 2 refer to the geometrical mean.
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Table 2: Growth rates Non–Euro–Group, separated by debt ratio level
Country Debt ratio ≤ 60% Debt ratio > 60% Average Time period
Denmark 1.34 (N=28) 2.46 (N=17) 1.76 (N=45) 1970–2014
Sweden 2.04 (N=38) 2.70 (N= 7) 2.14 (N=45) 1970–2014
United Kingdom 2.58 (N=12) 1.50 (N=33) 2.29 (N=45) 1970–2014
Iceland 3.84 (N=36) 0.26 (N=7) 3.25 (N=43) 1972–2014
Norway 2.97 (N=44) 2.80 (N= 1) 2.97 (N=45) 1970–2014
Switzerland 1.55 (N=37) 2.05 (N= 7) 1.63 (N=44) 1971–2014
Panel 2.44 (N=195) 1.91 (N=72) 2.34 (N=267) 1972–2014
(and therefore are not bound by the Maastricht treaty) or are not part of the European
Union. Table 2 presents the average growth rates separated by debt ratios below or above
60%. Again, the last column presents the overall average in each country. The final row
shows the pooled average of the panel. There are N = 45 observations per country, except
for Switzerland (N=44, no 1970 obs.) and Iceland (N=43, no 1970, 1971 obs.).
Regarding the growth–debt ratio nexus, the results from table 2 present a similar
overall impression for the control group: economic growth is higher if the debt ratio is
lower than 60%. This outcome does not hold for each economy, for instance, the Danish,
Swedish and Swiss growth rates are even higher if the debt ratio exceeds 60%. However,
for the other countries the outcome supports the results from the Euro–zone economies:
growth is higher if debt is below the reference value.
Moreover, a comparison of table 1 and table 2 reveals another interesting result. It
does not only pay off to fulfill the reference value, but it also pays to participate in the
Euro–zone. On average the growth rate has been higher for the Euro–12 group (2.57%)
than for the control group (2.34%) over the past 45 years. Of course, the idea of the
EU/Euro–zone came up later and became more tangible during the 1990s, nevertheless
these long-run data suggest that it may pay off to participate.
Certainly, as regards the distribution or the amount of observations in each category,
the panel is characterized by heterogeneity. The numbers differ, not only on country level,
but also on the aggregated level. About 60% of the total observations are in the category
of 60% and lower, while about 40% are ascribed to values above the benchmark in the
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Euro–zone. Of course, this may be due to influences of countries which do not have debt
ratios above 60% such as Luxembourg or Finland. But it should also be kept in mind that
there are economies in which in a majority of periods the debt ratio was higher than 60%,
such as Belgium or Italy. This also holds for the control group of non–Euro economies.
For the whole group over 70% of the observations reveal a debt ratio below 60% of GDP.
However, the example of the United Kingdom shows, that most of the time the debt ratio
was above the benchmark.
Nevertheless, the central massage remains, if debt ratios are kept low, it pays off
in terms of higher growth rates. Plus, Euro–zone members on average exceed higher
economic growth than non–members.
2.3 Estimation results
This section elaborates a little more on the relationship between economic growth and
the public debt ratio in the selected countries. We estimate the following regression given
by equation (1) (cf. for instance Kumar and Woo (2010) or Fincke and Greiner (2015)):
γi,t = a0 +
∑
j
ajZj,i,t−1 + i,t. (1)
Here, γi,t indicates the real GDP growth rate, i reflects the country and t states time. Z
is a vector of regressors,  is the error term. All regressor variables enter the regression
in lagged terms. In this way it is possible to measure the effect of a certain variable on
subsequent output growth (and it is more plausible that the reaction takes some time to
adjust and rather does not effect growth immediately). Due to this lagged structure, the
model covers only the years from 1971 to 2014.3 The variable of interest is the public
debt ratio, which is included in Z. The other regressors are standard macroeconomic
variables. Especially we included inflation, the current account balance and government
consumption as controls.
The results for the Euro–zone are presented in table 3. It shows that all of the coef-
ficients are statistically significant. Not only the debt ratio but also the controls provide
an important contribution in explaining economic growth in the selected economies.
The findings present a negative correlation between the debt ratio in the previous pe-
riod and the subsequent economic growth in the group of the twelve Euro–zone economies.
3 Technically, this also mitigates endogeneity.
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Table 3: Regression results Euro–zone
Dependent variable: real GDP growth
Debt ratio −0.024∗∗∗ (0.006)
Inflation −0.238∗∗∗ (0.028)
Current account balance 0.179∗∗∗ (0.034)
Government consumption −0.013∗∗∗ (0.002)
Country fixed effects:
Austria 0.175∗∗∗ (0.015)
Belgium 0.186∗∗∗ (0.015)
Finland 0.169∗∗∗ (0.015)
France 0.203∗∗∗ (0.018)
Germany 0.194∗∗∗ (0.018)
Greece 0.191∗∗∗ (0.015)
Ireland 0.197∗∗∗ (0.014)
Italy 0.209∗∗∗ (0.018)
Luxembourg 0.127∗∗∗ (0.013)
Netherlands 0.178∗∗∗ (0.016)
Portugal 0.193∗∗∗ (0.015)
Spain 0.199∗∗∗ (0.017)
Observations 528
R2 0.620
Adjusted R2 0.608
Residual Std. Error 0.024 (df = 512)
F Statistic 52.261∗∗∗ (df = 16; 512)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses
Moreover, the controls show the expected signs: inflation has a negative influence on
growth, just like government spending. However, the current account balance indicates
to have a positive effect on subsequent economic growth. These outcomes are in line with
most of the literature: there seems to be a negative relationship between public debt and
economic growth (e.g. Kumar and Woo (2010)). From the economic policy perspective
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Table 4: Regression results control group
Dependent variable: real GDP growth
Debt ratio −0.002 (0.010)
Inflation −0.022 (0.019)
Current account balance 0.061 (0.038)
Government consumption −0.006∗ (0.003)
Country fixed effects:
Denmark 0.083∗∗ (0.027)
Iceland 0.059∗∗∗ (0.012)
Norway 0.091∗∗∗ (0.025)
Sweden 0.089∗∗ (0.028)
Switzerland 0.076∗∗ (0.025)
UK 0.101∗∗ (0.032)
Observations 252
R2 0.517
Adjusted R2 0.497
Residual Std. Error 0.024 (df = 242)
F Statistic 25.875∗∗∗ (df = 10; 242)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses
this can be interpreted in a way that for Euro–zone economies it is especially important
to keep debt ratios low in order to keep up economic growth.
This regression analysis is also conducted for the control group of non–Euro economies.
Table 4 presents the outcomes.4 In table 4 all coefficients show the expected signs, but only
the regressor government consumption is statistically significant (besides the country fixed
effects). Thus, the findings for the control group signify that the negative effect of debt on
growth is not as distinct as for the Euro–group above. For the debt growth relationship
this can be interpreted in a way that for non Euro–zone economies this correlation is
not as pronounced as for the members, however, the statistical calculations from table 2
4 Please note, due to missing observations this data set runs only from 1973–2014 with lagged regres-
sors.
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Table 5: Results robustness check: plain model
Estimation γt ∼ bt−1 Dependent variable: real GDP growth
Country: EU group Control group
Debt ratio -0.021*** (0.004) -0.011 (0.009)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses
indicate that the economic growth rates are higher if debt ratios are kept low for these
non–Euro countries, too.
In order to check how robust our results are we conducted some robustness checks
with the central focus on the debt-growth relationship. First, we checked on the plain
relationship of the lagged debt ratio bt−1 on growth γt (no control variables) in a simple
pooled OLS model. The outcome is presented in table 5. The results confirm the findings
from above: the coefficient is negative for both, the EU group and the control group, but
only statistically for the former.
If we now take into consideration that this panel spans over four decades and during
these years many political and economic changes happened on the continent, a natural
idea would be to separate the effects over time. Instead of a formal structural break
test, we split the regressions into the four decades5 and present the estimation outcomes
separately. We pool the observations of each group to present the common response for
EU members and countries outside. Table 6 presents the results.
It shows that for the EU group the response only becomes significant for the last
two decades, i.e. after 1993. This supports the view that with the intensified European
integration many things changed for these countries. This effect is not visible for the
economies outside the Union. The plots for the estimations are visualized in figures 2a
and 2b. Certainly, the goodness of fit is improvable, but the plots nicely depict the
rather loose relation in the 70s and 80s for the EU then becoming negative with the latter
5 Technically speaking, we divide the time period into four equally spaced, non-overlapping intervals,
i.e. 1971-1981, 1982-1992, 1993-2003, 2004-2014. Each one consists of 11 years. Please note, due to
the shorter time period available, for the control group the first interval starts in 1973.
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Table 6: Results robustness check: plain model by decades
Estimation: γt ∼ bt−1 Dependent variable: real GDP growth
Country: EU group Control group
Debt ratio
1970s 0.006 (0.015) -0.050** (0.025)
1980s -0.003 (0.007) 0.021 (0.022)
1990s -0.012* (0.007) 0.006 (0.016)
2000s -0.031*** (0.007) -0.009 (0.019)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses
two periods. For the selected economies outside the EU, the relationship only shows a
significant relationship in the 70s.
Moreover, the main message remains: high growth goes along with low debt ratios.
This was the case for the EU members in the early phase of the intervals (especially the
1970s). Moreover, the binding regulations for sustainable public finances in terms of low
deficits (< 3% of GDP) and low debt ratios (< 60% of GDP) as they are written in the MT
can be justified, as the EU group seems to have more difficulties to meet them especially
in recent years, which then may help to explain the negative correlation in table 6.
3 Conclusion
This paper analyses the relationship between public debt and economic growth for selected
European economies empirically. They are divided into two groups, the EU 12, which all
have the Euro as common currency and the control group which consists of six economies
that are non Euro-members and some even not EU members. In a first step, for each group
the economic growth rates are studied by separating the debt ratio in values below 60%
of GDP and above. It shows that if debt ratios are kept below the Maastricht benchmark,
growth rates are higher. This holds true for both groups. Moreover, it shows, that growth
rates are higher in the Euro–zone than in the control group. From an economic policy
perspective this can be interpreted that it does pay of to be a Euro–zone member. Even
if the tight coordination may come along with some difficulties.
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This latter aspect becomes clear in the second part of the analysis. The regression
estimations yields a negative effect of increasing public debt on subsequent growth. This
is statistically significant for the Euro–zone group, while the coefficient is not significant
for the countries of the control group. Obviously it is especially important to run low debt
ratios for Euro-members with their tight interrelations and dependencies. Separating the
response by decades for both groups supports this view. It shows that this negative effect
becomes especially pronounced since 1993 for the EU members. This impact is not visible
for the economies outside the Union.
Regarding policy implications the results call for prudent fiscal decisions especially in
the Euro–zone. They seem to be more prone to the negative relationship between public
debt and growth. For keeping up growth and prospects for the future these aspects should
be kept in mind in order to hold and maintain the result that growth is higher inside the
Euro–zone.
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(a) Plots by decades, Euro–12
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(b) Plots by decades, Non–Euro
Figure 2: Plots separated by decades
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